You should consult with a professional where appropriate. Neither the publisher nor author shall be liable for any loss of profit or any other commercial damages, including but not limited to special, incidental, consequential, or other damages.
For general information on our other products and services or for technical support, please contact our Customer Care Department within the United States at , outside the United States at or fax Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats.
Some content that appears in print may not be available in electronic books. For more information about Wiley products, visit our web site at www. Index mutual funds. B Samuelson, professor of economics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Nobel Laureate, investment sage. In when I was a student at Princeton University, his classic textbook introduced me to economics. In , his writings reignited my interest in market indexing as an investment strategy. In , he wrote the foreword to my first book, and in he provided a powerful endorsement for my second.
Now in his ninety-second year, he remains my mentor, my inspiration, my shining light. As the Oracle has said, it is simple, but it is not easy. By doing so you are guaran- teed to capture almost the entire return that they gener- ate in the form of dividends and earnings growth. The best way to implement this strategy is indeed sim- ple: Buying a fund that holds this market portfolio, and hold- ing it forever.
Such a fund is called an index fund. Such funds eliminate the risk of individual stocks, the risk of market sectors, and the risk of manager selection, with only stock market risk re- maining which is quite large enough, thank you.
Index funds make up for their short-term lack of excitement by their truly exciting long-term productivity. Only stock market risk remains. This is much more than a book about index funds. It is a book that is determined to change the very way that you think about investing. For when you understand how our financial markets actually work, you will see that the index fund is indeed the only investment that guarantees you will capture your fair share of the returns that busi- ness earns.
Today, if you wish, you could literally hold all your wealth in a diversified set of index funds representing asset classes within the United States or the global economy. The index fund simply owns corporate Amer- ica, buying an interest in each stock in the stock market in proportion to its market capitalization and then holding it forever.
Over the past century, our corporations have earned a return on their capital of 9. If we use real inflation-adjusted dollars, the return drops from 9.
The returns earned by business are ultimately trans- lated into the returns earned by the stock market. I have no way of knowing what share of these returns you have earned in the past. But academic studies suggest that if you are a typical investor in individual stocks, your re- turns have probably lagged the market by about 2.
Result: your slice of the market pie, as it were, has been less than 80 percent. These iron rules define the game. Each extra return that one of us earns means that another of our fellow investors suffers a return shortfall of precisely the same dimension. Before the deduction of the costs of investing, beating the stock market is a zero-sum game. So who wins?
You know who wins. The man in the middle actually, the men and women in the middle, the brokers, the investment bankers, the money managers, the marketers, the lawyers, the ac- countants, the operations departments of our financial system is the only sure winner in the game of invest- ing.
Our financial croupiers always win. In the casino, the house always wins. In horse racing, the track al- ways wins. In the powerball lottery, the state always wins. Investing is no different. Yes, after the costs of financial intermediation—all those brokerage commissions, portfolio transaction costs, and fund operating expenses; all those investment management fees; all those advertising dollars and all those marketing schemes; and all those legal costs and custodial fees that we pay, day after day and year after year—beating the market is inevitably a game for losers.
No matter how many books are published and promoted purporting to show how easy it is to win, investors fall short. The wonderful magic of compounding returns that is reflected in the long-term productivity of American busi- ness, then, is translated into equally wonderful returns in the stock market. But those returns are overwhelmed by the powerful tyranny of compounding the costs of invest- ing. For those who choose to play the game, the odds in favor of the successful achievement of superior returns are terrible.
Simply playing the game consigns the aver- age investor to a woeful shortfall to the returns generated by the stock market over the long term. Most investors in stocks think that they can avoid the pitfalls of investing by due diligence and knowledge, trading stocks with alacrity to stay one step ahead of the game.
An academic study showed that the most active one-fifth of all stock traders turned their portfolios over at the rate of more than 21 percent per month. While they earned the mar- ket return of They are wrong. Mutual fund investors, too, have inflated ideas of their own omniscience.
They pick funds based on the re- cent performance superiority of fund managers, or even their long-term superiority, and hire advisers to help them do the same thing. But, the advisers do it with even less success see Chapters 8, 9, and Oblivious of the toll taken by costs, fund investors willingly pay heavy sales loads and incur excessive fund fees and expenses, and are unknowingly subjected to the substantial but hidden transaction costs incurred by funds as a result of their hy- peractive portfolio turnover.
Fund investors are confident that they can easily select superior fund managers. Contrarily, for those who invest and then drop out of the game and never pay a single unnecessary cost, the odds in favor of success are awesome. Simply because they own businesses, and businesses as a group earn substantial returns on their capital and pay out dividends to their own- ers.
Yes, many individual companies fail. It will also tell you how easy it is to do just that: simply buy the entire stock market. Then, once you have bought your stocks, get out of the casino and stay out. Just hold the market portfolio forever. This investment philosophy is not only simple and ele- gant. The arithmetic on which it is based is irrefutable. But it is not easy to follow its discipline. But I ask you to carefully consider the impassioned message of this little book.
When you do, you, too, will want to join the revolution and invest in a new, more eco- nomical, more efficient, even more honest way, a more pro- ductive way that will put your own interest first. Schumpeter in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, New ideas that fly in the face of the conventional wis- dom of the day are always greeted with doubt, scorn, and even fear.
Indeed, years ago the same challenge was faced by Thomas Paine, whose tract Common Sense helped spark the American Revolution. Here is what Tom Paine wrote: Perhaps the sentiments contained in the following pages are not yet sufficiently fashionable to procure them general favor; a long habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial appearance of being right, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defense of cus- tom. But the tumult soon subsides.
Time makes more converts than reason. In the following pages, I offer nothing more than simple facts, plain arguments, and common sense; and have no other preliminaries to settle with the reader, than that he will divest himself of prejudice and prepos- session, and suffer his reason and his feelings to deter- mine for themselves; that he will put on, or rather that he will not put off, the true character of a man, and generously enlarge his views beyond the present day.
The American Revolu- tion led to our Constitution, which to this day defines the responsibility of our government, our citizens, and the fabric of our society. In this new book, I reiterate that proposition.
Or at least that your own par- ticipation in it will be fixed. Of course I do! But not because it enriches me to do so. In the early years of indexing, my voice was a lonely one. But there were a few other thoughtful and re- spected believers whose ideas inspired me to carry on my mission.
Today, many of the wisest and most suc- cessful investors endorse the index fund concept, and among academics, the acceptance is close to universal. Listen to these indepen- dent experts with no axe to grind except for the truth about investing. Listen, for example, to this endorsement by Paul A. Then, at last, whatever returns our businesses may be generous enough to deliver in the years ahead, reflected as they will be in our stock and bond markets, you will be guaranteed to earn your fair share.
JOHN C. Mu- tual funds charge two percent per year and then bro- kers switch people between funds, costing another three to four percentage points. The poor guy in the general public is getting a terrible product from the professionals. Only a fool takes on the additional risk of doing yet more damage by failing to diver- sify properly with his or her nest egg.
Avoid the problem—buy a well-run index fund and own the whole market. Over long periods of time, hardly any fund managers have beaten the market averages. They encourage in- vestors, rather than spread their risks wisely or seek the best match for their future liabilities, to put their money into the most modish assets going, often just when they become overvalued. And all the while they charge their clients big fees for the privilege of losing their money.
One specific lesson. It is better to invest in an indexed fund that promises a market return but with significantly lower fees. May their com- mon sense, perhaps even more than my own, make you all wiser investors. Perhaps this homely parable—my ver- sion of a story told by Warren Buffett, chairman of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.
A wealthy family named the Gotrocks, grown over the gen- erations to include thousands of brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, and cousins, owned percent of every stock in the United States. Each year, they reaped the rewards of investing: all the earnings growth that those thousands of corporations generated and all the dividends that they dis- tributed.
These Helpers convince the cousins to sell some of their shares in the companies to other family members and to buy some shares of others from them in return. The Helpers handle the transactions, and as bro- kers, they receive commissions for their services. The ownership is thus rearranged among the family members. To their surprise, however, the family wealth begins to grow at a slower pace.
They recognize that their foray into stock-picking has been a failure and conclude that they need profes- sional assistance, the better to pick the right stocks for themselves. So they hire stock-picking experts—more Helpers! These money managers charge a fee for their services. So when the family ap- praises its wealth a year later, it finds that its share of the pie has diminished even further. They retain the best investment consultants and financial planners they can find to advise them on how to select the right man- agers, who will then surely pick the right stocks.
The consultants, of course, tell them they can do exactly that. Then our family will again reap percent of the pie that Corporate America bakes for us.
Alarmed at last, the family sits down together and takes stock of the events that have transpired since some of them began to try to outsmart the others. Go back to square one, and do so immediately. Get rid of all your brokers. Get rid of all your money managers. Get rid of all your consultants. Then our family will again reap percent of however large a pie that corporate America bakes for us, year after year. That is exactly what an index fund does.
Accurate as that cryptic statement is, I would add that the parable reflects the profound conflict of interest between those who work in the investment business and those who invest in stocks and bonds. Do something. Just stand there. When any business is con- ducted in a way that directly defies the interests of its clients in the aggregate, it is only a matter of time until change comes. The higher the level of their investment activity, the greater the cost of financial intermediation and taxes, the less the net return that the business owners as a group receive.
The lower the costs that investors as a group incur, the higher rewards that they reap. So to realize the winning returns generated by businesses over the long term, the intelligent investor will minimize to the bare bones the costs of financial intermediation. Most people think they can find managers who can outperform, but most people are wrong.
I will say that 85 to 90 percent of managers fail to match their benchmarks. Because managers have fees and incur transaction costs, you know that in the aggregate they are delet- ing value. First, get diversified. Come up with a portfolio that covers a lot of asset classes. Second, you want to keep your fees low. That means avoid- ing the most hyped but expensive funds, in favor of low-cost index funds. And finally, invest for the long term. No doubt about it. Active management as a whole cannot achieve gross returns exceeding the market as a while and therefore they must, on average, underper- form the indexes by the amount of these expense and transaction costs disadvantages.
Many people will find the guarantee of playing the stock-market game at par every round a very attractive one. Yet the record is clear. History, if only we would take the trouble to look at it, reveals the remarkable, if essential, linkage between the cumulative long-term returns earned by business—the annual dividend yield plus the annual rate of earnings growth—and the cumulative returns earned by the U. Think about that certainty for a mo- ment.
Can you see that it is simple common sense? Need proof? Just look at the record since the twenti- eth century began Exhibit 2. The average annual total return on stocks was 9.
That tiny difference of 0. Depending on how one looks at it, it is merely statistical noise, or perhaps it reflects a generally upward long-term trend in stock valuations, a willingness of investors to pay higher prices for each dollar of earn- ings at the end of the period than at the beginning. Compounding these returns over years produced accumulations that are truly staggering.
Each dollar ini- tially invested in at an investment return of 9. But increasing real wealth nearly times over is not to be sneezed at. Sometimes, as in the Great Depression of the early s, these bumps are large.
But we get over them. So, if you stand back from the chart and squint your eyes, the trend of business fundamentals looks al- most like a straight line sloping gently upward, and those periodic bumps are barely visible.
Stock market returns sometimes get well ahead of business fundamentals as in the late s, the early s, the late s. But it has been only a matter of time until, as if drawn by a magnet, they soon return, al- though often only after falling well behind for a time as in the mids, the late s, the market lows.
In our foolish focus on the short-term stock market distractions of the moment, we, too, often overlook this long history. We ignore that when the returns on stocks depart materially from the long-term norm, it is rarely be- cause of the economics of investing—the earnings growth and dividend yields of our corporations. Rather, the rea- son that annual stock returns are so volatile is largely be- cause of the emotions of investing. Back and forth, over and over again, swings in the emotions of investors momentar- ily derail the steady long-range upward trend in the eco- nomics of investing.
So, while in- vestors seem to intuitively accept that the past is inevitably prologue to the future, any past stock market returns that have included a high speculative stock re- turn component are a deeply flawed guide to what lies ahead. Exhibit 2. Note first the steady contribution of dividend yields to total return during each decade; always positive, only once outside the range of 3 percent to 7 per- cent, and averaging 4.
Result: Total investment returns the top line, combining dividend yield and earnings growth were negative in only a single decade again, in the s. These total investment returns—the gains made by business—were remarkably steady, gener- ally running in the range of 8 percent to 13 percent each year, and averaging 9.
Enter speculative return. Curiously, without excep- tion, every decade of significantly negative speculative return was immediately followed by a decade in which it turned positive by a correlative amount—the quiet s and then the roaring s, the dispiriting s and then the booming s, the discouraging s and then the soaring s—reversion to the mean RTM writ large.
Reversion to the mean can be thought of as the tendency for stock returns to return to their long-term norms over time—periods of exceptional returns tend to be followed by periods of below average performance, and vice versa. Then, amazingly, there is an unprecedented second consecutive exuberant increase in speculative re- turn in the s, a pattern never before in evidence. As a result, speculative return has added just 0. When we combine these two sources of stock re- turns, we get the total return produced by the stock mar- ket Exhibit 2.
The average annual total return on stocks of 9. The message is clear: in the long run, stock returns depend al- most entirely on the reality of the investment returns earned by our corporations. The perception of investors, reflected by the speculative returns, counts for little. It is economics that controls long-term equity returns; emo- tions, so dominant in the short-term, dissolve. But forecasting the long-term economics of investing carries remarkably high odds of success.
After more than 55 years in this business, I have ab- solutely no idea how to forecast these swings in investor emotions. In fact, 70 years of financial re- search show that no one has done so. Put another way, while illusion the momentary prices we pay for stocks often loses touch with reality the intrinsic values of our corpora- tions , in the long run it is reality that rules.
To drive this point home, think of investing as consisting of two different games. Where real com- panies spend real money to make and sell real products and services, and, if they play with skill, earn real profits and pay real dividends. This game also requires real strategy, deter- mination, and expertise; real innovation and real foresight. In the short-term, stock prices go up only when the expectations of investors rise, not necessarily when sales, margins, or profits rise.
The expectations market is about speculation. The real market is about investing. The only logical conclusion: the stock market is a giant distraction that causes investors to focus on transitory and volatile in- vestment expectations rather than on what is really impor- tant—the gradual accumulation of the returns earned by corporate business.
My advice to investors is to ignore the short-term noise of the emotions reflected in our financial markets and focus on the productive long-term economics of our corporate businesses.
He should always remember that market quo- tations are there for his convenience, either to be taken advantage of or to be ignored. One of your part- ners, named Mr. Market, is very obliging indeed. Every day he tells you what he thinks your interest is worth and furthermore offers either to buy you out or to sell you an additional interest on that basis. Sometimes his idea of value appears plausible and justified by business developments and prospects. Often, on the other hand, Mr.
Market lets his enthu- siasm or his fears run away with him, and the value he proposes seems little short of silly. Only in case you agree with him or in case you want to trade with him. The true investor. Simply by buying a portfolio that owns the shares of every business in the United States and then holding it forever. It is a simple concept that guarantees you will win the invest- ment game played by most other investors who—as a group—are guaranteed to lose. By far the simplest way to own all of U.
It is essentially composed of the largest U. The beauty of such a cap-weighted index is that it automatically adjusts to changing stock prices and never has to buy and sell stocks for that reason. With the enormous growth of corporate pension funds between and , it was an ideal measurement stan- dard, the benchmark or hurdle rate that would be the com- parative standard for how their professional managers were performing. In , an even more comprehensive measure of the U.
However, because its component stocks also are weighted by their market cap- italization, those remaining 4, stocks account for only about 20 percent of its value.
Nonetheless, this broadest of all U. The two indexes have a similar composition. Exhibit 3. Given the similarity of these two portfolios, it is hardly surprising that the two indexes have earned returns that are in lockstep with one another. The Center for Research in Se- curity Prices at the University of Chicago has gone back to and calculated the returns earned by all U. Its data since have provided a virtually perfect match to the Total Stock Market Index.
In fact, returns of the two indexes parallel one another with near precision. From , the beginning of the measurement period, through , you can hardly tell them apart Exhibit 3. Exxon Mobil 3. Exxon Mobil 2. General Electric 3. General Electric 2. Citigroup 2. Citigroup 1. Bank of America 1. Microsof t 1. Pfizer 1. American International Group 1. Altria Group 1. Morgan 1. Chevron 1. American International Group 0.
This represents what we call a period dependent outcome—everything depends on the starting date and the ending date. If we were to begin the comparison at the beginning of instead of , the re- turns of the two would be identical: 9.
But in recent years to , small- and mid-cap stocks did bet- ter, and the Total Stock Market Index return of 3. But with a long-term correlation of 0.
Whichever measure we use, it should now be obvious that the returns earned by the publicly held corporations that compose the stock market must of necessity equal the aggregate gross returns earned by all investors in that market as a group.
Equally obvious, as discussed in Chap- ter 4, the net returns earned by these investors must of necessity fall short of those aggregate gross returns by the amount of intermediation costs they incur.
Such an all-market fund is guaranteed to outpace over time the returns earned by equity investors as a group. Once you recognize this fact, you can see that the index fund is guaranteed to win not only over time, but every year, and every month and week, even every minute of the day. If the data do not prove that indexing wins, well, the data are wrong. That is because there is no pos- sible way to calculate the returns earned by the millions of diverse participants, amateur and professional alike, Amer- icans and foreign investors, in the U.
Since there are many small-cap and mid-cap funds, usually with rel- atively modest asset bases, they make a disproportion- ate impact on the data. When small- and mid- cap funds are leading the total market, the all-market index fund seems to lag. When small- and mid- cap stocks are lagging the market, the index fund looks formidable indeed.
Nonetheless, the exercise of calculating how the re- turns earned by the stock market compare with returns earned by the average equity fund is both illuminating and persuasive Exhibit 3. The Index has outpaced the average fund in 26 of the remaining 35 years, including 11 of the past 15 years.
Its average ranking was in the 58th percentile outperforming 58 percent of the comparable actively managed funds , leading, as we will show in Chapter 4, to enormous superiority over time. It is hard to imagine that even a single one of the large-cap core eq- uity funds has a similar record of consistency. Consistency matters.
A fund that is good or very good in the vast majority of years produces a far larger long- term return than a fund that is superb in half the years and a disaster in the remaining half. In the next chapter, the impact of that long-term consistency is catalogued over the past 25 years.
These annual data are what we call survivor-biased; they exclude the records of the inevitably poorer perform- ing funds that regularly go out of business. As a result of this noise in the data, the chart further understates the success of the market-owning index strategy. While the criticism is valid, the excellent long-term record of the flawed Index belies the existence of a sig- nificant problem. In fact, since the market peaked early in as shown in Exhibit 3. I imagine that the vast majority of money managers would have been ec- static with such an outcome.
Equally important, it is consistent with the age-old principle expressed by Sir William of Occam: instead of joining the crowd of investors who dabble in complex machinations to pick stocks and try to outguess the stock market two inevitably fruitless tasks for investors in the aggregate , choose the simplest of all solutions—buy and hold the market portfolio.
Of the equity mutual funds then in exis- tence, only remain. The 96 percent of funds that fail to meet or beat the Vanguard Index Fund lose by a wealth-destroying margin of 4. Indexing is also the predominant strategy for the largest of them all, the retirement plan for federal government employees, the Federal Thrift Savings Plan TSP.
All contributions and earnings are tax-deferred until withdrawal, much like the corpo- rate k thrift plans. Overcoming what must have been some serious reservations, even the Bush administration determined to follow the TSP model in its plan for Personal Savings Accounts as an op- tional alternative to our Social Security program. Since , the Vanguard index fund has produced a compound annual return of 12 percent, better than three- quarters of its peer group.
Yet even 30 years on, ig- norance and professional omerta still stand in the way of more investors enjoying the fruits of this un- sung hero of the investment world. To understand why they do not, we need only to recognize the simple mathematics of investing: All investors as a group must necessarily earn precisely the market return, but only before the costs o f investing are deducted.
In a market that returns 10 per- cent, we investors together earn a gross return of 10 per- cent. But after we pay our financial intermediaries, we pocket only what remains. And we pay them whether our returns are positive or negative! The returns earned by investors in the aggregate inevitably fall well short of the returns that are realized in our financial markets. How much do those costs come to?
For individual investors holding stocks directly, trading costs average about 1. That cost is lower about 1 percent for those who trade infrequently, and much higher for in- vestors who trade frequently for example, 3 percent for investors who turn their portfolios over at a rate above percent per year. In equity mutual funds, management fees and operat- ing expenses—combined, called the expense ratio—aver- age about 1.
If the shares are held for five years, the cost would be twice that figure—1 percent per year. But then add a giant additional cost, all the more per- nicious by being invisible.
I am referring to the hidden cost of portfolio turnover, estimated at a full 1 percent per year. At that rate, brokerage commissions, bid-ask spreads, and market impact costs add a major layer of additional costs. So if we pay nothing, we get everything. Most equity funds hold about 5 percent in cash reserves. If stocks earn a 10 percent return and these reserves earn 4 percent, that cost would add another 0.
Brandeis first published in , I came across a wonderful passage that illustrates this sim- ple lesson. Brandeis, later to become one of the most in- fluential jurists in the history of the U. Supreme Court, railed against the oligarchs who a century ago controlled investment America and corporate America alike. Because the relentless rules of the arith- metic of investing are so obvious.
Indeed, the self-interest of the leaders of our financial system almost compels them to ignore these relentless rules. Their self-interest will not soon change. But as an investor, you must look after your self- interest. Only by facing the obvious realities of investing can the intelligent investor succeed.
How much do the costs of financial intermediation matter? When you think about it, how could it be otherwise? By and large, these managers are smart, well-educated, experienced, knowledgeable, and honest.
But they are competing with each other. When one buys a stock, another sells it. There is no net gain to fund shareholders as a group. In fact, they incur a loss equal to the transaction costs they pay to those Helpers that Warren Buffett warned us about in Chapter 1.
Investors pay far too little attention to the costs of in- vesting. Perhaps an example will help. Result: a net annual return of just 5. In the early years, the line showing the growth at a 5. But ever so slowly, the lines begin to diverge, finally at a truly dramatic rate. It makes them worse. Where returns are concerned, time is your friend.
And by the end of the invest- ment period, costs have consumed nearly 70 percent of the potential accumulation available simply by holding the market portfolio. Add that mathematical certainty to the relentless rules of hum- ble arithmetic described earlier. But enough of theory and hypothetical examples. The return on the average mu- tual fund averaged just That 2. Never forget: Market return, minus cost, equals investor return. Fund investors, inevitably at the bot- tom of the food chain, have been left with too small a share.
Investors need not have incurred that loss. Such a fund actually returned That is an annual margin of superiority of 2. On first impression, that annual gap may not look large. But when compounded over 25 years, it reaches staggering proportions. Both of these accumulations are overstated because they are based on dollars, which have less than half the spending power they enjoyed in During this period, inflation eroded the real buying power of these returns at an average rate of 3.
Now, the average fund produced barely one-half ac- tually 53 percent of the profit earned by the stock market through the simple index fund—a return that was there for the taking. It is in the nature of arithmetic that de- ducting the same inflation rate from both figures further increases the comparative advantage of the investment with the higher return, in this case the index fund.
Yes, costs matter! Indeed, costs make the difference between investment success and investment failure. You can add and subtract for yourself. It equals you guessed it only 6.
Do your own arithmetic. Realize that you are not consigned to playing the hyperac- tive management game that is played by the overwhelming majority of individual investors and mutual fund owners alike. The index fund is there to guarantee that you will earn your fair share of whatever returns our businesses earn and our stock market delivers. That is a four-bagger. The general equity funds are up percent.
The public would be better off in an index fund. Even hyperactive investors seem to believe in in- dexing strategies. It is what we should all own in theory and it has delivered low-cost eq- uity returns to a great mass of investors.
But the idea that fund investors themselves actually earn those returns proves to be a grand illusion. Not only an illu- sion, but a generous one. The reality is considerably worse. Colossians Notes Scripture References: st. Of this period Southey says:— "His mind, though possessed by its fatal delusion, had recovered in some degree its activity, and in some of his most melancholy moments he used to compose lines descriptive of his own unhappy state. He says:— "Thursday, July 6th [].
Taken from the original. For Leaders Bulletin Blurb Worship Notes Scores This hymn was written by William Cowper, a man who was afflicted with mental illness and depression for a large portion of his life. His illness got so severe that he tried to commit suicide three times. With treatment and the inspiration of his friend John Newton, he began to recover and write hymns. Text: The words to this hymn were written by William Cowper in right before he began suffering from depressive illness.
Luke Getz Hymnary. FlexScores are available in the Media section below. You have access to this FlexScore. Download: Are parts of this score outside of your desired range? Try transposing this FlexScore. General Settings. Text size Text size:. Music size Music size:. Capo Capo:.
Contacting server This is a preview of your FlexScore. Page Scans. View Page. African Methodist Episcopal Church Hymnal Ambassador Hymnal An Eclectic Harmony.
Ancient and Modern Anglican Hymns Old and New Rev. Baptist Hymnal Scripture : Psalm Date : Celebrating Grace Hymnal Christian Worship Church Hymnal, Fifth Edition Church Hymnal, Mennonite Scripture : Romans Date : Church Hymnary 4th ed.
Common Praise Complete Anglican Hymns Old and New Complete Mission Praise Evangelical Lutheran Hymnary Glory to God Hymns and Psalms 65a. Hymns and Psalms 65b. Hymns for a Pilgrim People Hymns of Glory, Songs of Praise Hymns of the Christian Life Hymns Old and New Hymns to the Living God Lift Up Your Hearts Lutheran Service Book Lutheran Worship Our Songs and Hymns Primitive Baptist Hymn and Tune Book Psalter Hymnal Gray Rejoice in the Lord Santo, Santo, Santo Themes All Themes.
Symbols All Symbols. Theme Wheel. Everything you need for every book you read. The way the content is organized and presented is seamlessly smooth, innovative, and comprehensive. Themes and Colors. LitCharts assigns a color and icon to each theme in A Streetcar Named Desire , which you can use to track the themes throughout the work.
Related Themes from Other Texts. Compare and contrast themes from other texts to this theme…. Find Related Themes. How often theme appears:. Scene 1. Scene 2. Scene 3. Scene 4. Scene 5. Scene 6. Scene 7. Scene 8. Scene 9. Scene Scene 1 Quotes. Related Characters: Blanche DuBois speaker. Related Symbols: The Streetcar. Related Themes: Sexual Desire. Page Number and Citation : 6 Cite this Quote. Explanation and Analysis:. Stella, oh, Stella, Stella! Stella for Star!
0コメント